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Abstract  The present contribution stands as a wider 
sociological reflection of some empirical evidence resulting 
from a national research project entitled “Federalism, Local 
Autonomy and Quality of Democracy”. In an attempt to 
understand the reasons for the substantial halt of the federal 
reform process in Italy, analysis of content of 60 interviews 
given by privileged witnesses of the administrative and local 
political system emphasized some cultural traits which 
played a seminal role. Above all, it has been detect the 
persistence of a ruling-classes political culture geared toward 
a “private” or group-oriented dimension of interest more 
than in accordance with public and collective aims, which 
creates a network of relationships between politics, society 
and the economy. This network is oriented to the defence of 
what has been achieved thanks to familistic (or neo-feudalist) 
mechanisms of interaction. By looking at the picture that 
emerges within a wider constructivist theoretical framework, 
it is possible to understand the Italian lack of engagement 
towards the bandwagon formed by countries that have 
managed to gain an advantage through the phenomena of 
globalization in terms of growth, competitiveness, 
development and democratization of decision-making 
processes in their political systems (by implementing, for 
example, inclusive decision-making practices supported by 
the use of new technologies of information and 
communication). The aim of the contribution is therefore a 
reflection on the Italian identity and political culture and 
their weight in shifting the impact of globalization from a 
potential added value for both national and local 
development to the virtual present loss of competitiveness of 
the whole system. 
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1. Introduction 
Identity and stereotype represent modes of perception of 
the ‘self’ and the ‘other’, whose construction processes at 
collective level substantially reflect the individual level: each 
individual "looks" to him/herself and to others through 
abstractions, symbols and generalisations arising from the 
interaction between person and community, enabled thanks 
to the process of socialisation [1]. Similarly, groups and 
communities form their specific ‘views’ of themselves and 
the others by using symbols, myths, ‘building’ traditions [2] 
and ‘labels’ that allow to ‘identify characteristics and 
behavioral expectations of the others in a concise and 
immediate way’ [3]. 
According to Santambrogio [4] the social representation 
corresponds to an ‘unconscious knowledge’, with which the 
individual comes into contact, through his belonging to a 
group, so that ‘he sees the world through the eyes of the 
group to which he belongs, thinking that is his way to see and 
the right way to see it’. 
Starting from these, we can then define the culture of a 
given society as "the intellectual and material heritage (...) 
made of values, norms, definitions, languages, symbols, 
signs, behavioural patterns, mental and body techniques, 
having cognitive, affective, evaluative, expressive, regulative 
and manipulative function" [5 p.186]. 
The present article grounds on the hypothesis that the form 
and content of action of individuals and, more in general, of 
groups - rather than the structural characteristics of a social 
group, linked to the concept of class, or the systemic features, 
its material resources or its ‘political and institutional 
architecture’ - can shape, internally, structures and systems, 
and, externally, the ability to take initiative or to respond to a 
stimulus, such as a technological innovation, a change in the 
production system or a financial and economic crisis. 
There are reasons that call into question the sphere of 
collective identity and substantiate, at a collective level, in 
cultural traits that mould and shape the social behaviour of 
entire groups of professionals. 
Above all, it is about cultural features along the slow 
process of historical change, which meet the wave of the 
individualisation process, resulting, in the Italian case, 
strengthened but in a negative sense. 
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‘Local’ features of social and cultural development 
overlap the deep global currents and the dichotomous effects 
of the individualisation process, and they may in fact 
determine conditions for or against change, able to ‘hold’ 
and accompany external solicitations, or rather be 
overwhelmed and resulting in an acceleration of ties and 
social fabric attrition process. 
Obviously we do not intend to say that ‘all’ the causes of 
the Italian stagnation are to be attributed to the cultural 
dimension, but rather that, given the global crisis, the effects 
are magnified when they meet specific cultures and 
collective attitudes which affect the social action. 
Thus, our hypothesis is based on a constructivist approach 
[6] and it argues that  the recession that has hit the Italian 
system for at least 4 years is only partially linked to cyclical 
factors (the global crisis), or structural macro-economic 
issues (the public debt, the burden of interest on the debt, the 
crisis of public finance, the lack of investments in innovation 
and production). 
The underlying reasons, on the contrary, arise from 
cultural traits that affect, in order, the political class, the 
business class, and the ‘social’ combination of citizens and 
civil society. These traits influence the political and social 
action of individuals belonging to the above mentioned 
groups, so to produce an overall output characterized by a 
systemic fragmentation and weakness that exposes to greater 
risks of adverse impacts, associated with any change, not 
only in market but also in political conditions. 
The cultural traits of the political class, of the business 
class and of the workers have therefore established, over the 
time, a ‘systemic disadvantage’, a complex web of 
dysfunctional relationships related to the research of 
inter-group benefits, if not even individual benefits. 
In order to obtain such a result it is not necessary that a 
lack of publicness and civicness pervades the entire society. 
It only needs its dominance in the cores from which 
radiates the political and economic power, combined with a 
'passive' acceptance, deriving in part from the same quest for 
some advantage, and in part by the ‘traditional’ deference 
citizenry shows towards the authority. This statement is well 
known within social science since Lijphart studies 
concerning the Dutch society, the democratic regimes and 
the role played by their political élites [7,8]. 
Moreover, we know, according to Crozier [9] for instance, 
that the bureaucratic system of a Nation 'reflects' the 
'cultural' characteristics of its inhabitants: thus, for example, 
the isolation of groups, the scarcity of informal relationships, 
or the extensive use of impersonal rules - highlighted in the 
case studies examined by the French sociologist - are 
explained not so much as features of a 'predominant' 
bureaucratic system resulting from the process of 
rationalisation (the Weberian ideal type), but by virtue of 
'cultural traits that are rather rooted in France' (p. 240) [9]. 
The French isolation in terms of interactions, the lack of 
‘cooperative spirit’, the closure towards upward social 
mobility, are the elements described not only by Crozier, but 
also in Tocqueville in regard to the French society of the 
nineteenth century, and in Goblot [10], who, in the early 
decades of the twentieth century, showed the ‘techniques’ in 
which the upper layers could ‘isolate’ and ‘seal’, in respect to 
the attempts of advancing of the lower layers. 
These same traits have been enclosed in the ‘French 
stereotype’ described by Arianna Montanari [1], who resorts 
to the transactional analysis of Berne to identify in the type 
ʹMe + /You   ̶  '  the essential characteristic of these people 
collective identity, while, for the Italian case, this type has to 
be identified by the scheme ʹMe – /You + ʹ. 
The proposed key to understanding the Italian case is 
based, therefore, on a specific process of fragmentation and 
on a lack of public spirit and sense of belonging to a common 
and wider social group (i.e. the nation)  that characterises 
the historical evolution, the ‘construction’ and “reproduction” 
of the Italian identity. Evidences of this process has come by 
the contents of the interviews administered in our case study 
regarding the federal reform, which underline a 
multi-dimensional conflict among political actors at different 
level of administration. Further and more general evidences, 
which strengthen our case study results, can be found by 
looking at other symbols of Italian culture and identity, such 
as literary and movie production.  
We deal with a social fragmentation and a political 
pulverisation of the collective interests which were born to 
maintain particular interests and that lead to a ‘paralysis’, 
and, in the long run, to defeating a whole system determined 
by the fear of losing what has been acquired by parts of it. 
2. The Italian Federal Reform: From an 
Institutional Renewal to a Missed 
Opportunity 
During the year 2013, the chair of political sociology at 
Sapienza University of Rome, together with 4 other Italian 
Universities, led the survey for a research project aimed to 
restore the possible answers to the impasse in the Italian 
federal reform process. 
The survey started with the analysis of documentary 
sources produced by the institutions involved in the reform 
(parliamentary records, files produced by technical 
committees, scientific production of lawyers, sociologists 
and political scientists), and continued through 60 in-depth 
interviews aimed at the players of the same process: local 
representatives, directors and regional administrative staff. 
The collected interviews and documents constitute the 
material from which we mined the considerations proposed 
in this article. 
The normative aim of the federal reform was, on an 
administrative level, to ‘modernise’ the system by giving 
empirical translation of principles such as subsidiarity, 
simplification, administrative transparency, and the 
optimisation of the management of public resources, through 
the decentralisation of decision-making and service centres. 
On a political level, this aspired to reconnect politics and 
administration with the citizen, to recover, through this and 
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other legislative and political interventions, a frayed 
relationship of trust, that only a few years earlier had 
received yet another blow by the events of ‘tangentopoli’ 
(Bribesville). Above all, the reform aimed to remove the 
spectre of potential secessionist phenomenon, played by the 
populist party “La Lega”, which began to make inroads not 
only in the centre-right constituency, but also in the left 
electorate. 
To summarize, federal reform was the tool for both a 
democratization process and a national consolidation 
attempt. 
The redefinition of the spheres of competence has proven 
extremely complex and, above all, a long-gestation (now 14 
years). It has been so difficult as to make some people talk of 
the ‘great unaccomplished’ referring to the reform, or of a 
‘crooked tree’ with respect to the process [11] . As at today, 
not only is the process unfinished, but further reform 
proposals have been added, such as the Senate Reform and 
some others. 
Behind this long-gestation process we can find mutual 
political vetoes, inter-institutional and intra-party conflicts as 
well as strategic actions which can be read as examples of an 
institutional and collective-oriented process stopped by 
groups attempting to defend particular or specific interests. 
“To realize in a concrete meaning a federal reform means 
to have an idea of the Nation that, unfortunately , those  who 
took part in this process during the last ten years did never 
possess…on the contrary, they looked only at their interests, 
above all electoral ones! As they were only local interests, 
they produced a crossroad of contradictions and paradox!” 
Administrative Director, Umbria 1 
In fact, according to the opinion of the interviewers the 
Italian federal reform has essentially been a missed 
opportunity, a process born out of a compromise of strategic 
and political nature; a "jumble" of rules and revisions, 
amongst the effects of which there has been a substantial 
indeterminacy of the roles pertaining to state on the one hand, 
and to local authorities on the other. This compromise shows 
a substantial lack of a “wide-ranging political vision” which 
could have ensured a better connection between national and 
local legislative and administrative duties. 
“While in the previous regionalism system there was a 
strong tie between democracy and development or between 
democracy, State reform and quality of the development, the 
actual Federal Reform comes from an illusion: that is, the 
illusion of the left-wing party to give an immediate answer to 
the Northern question… the previous institutional order, that 
is regionalism, has been the result of an in-depth reflection 
concerning the Italian economic and institutional path, the 
present institutional arrangement has missed this seminal 
argument” 
Pol.Umbria3 
Thus, what seems to lack since the beginning of this 
reform is a deliberative moment among the different political 
forces, that, in terms of political values, can be explained as 
the decline of the “constitutional spirit” which had guided 
the previous four decades of Italian political life. In fact, 
despite the substantial differences between the Christian 
Democracy (DC) and the Italian Communist Party (PCI), a 
general consensus on the most important norms – and about 
their possible reform - has always existed. Specific studies 
conducted by Giovanni Sartori during the 1960s, show that 
74% of the laws overall approved has been voted by the 
Communist Party during the first four legislatures of the 
Second World War republican period. 
On the contrary, the own modalities that led to the first 
federal reformist step, that is the Constitutional Law which 
has emended the norms concerning central and local 
legislative powers, represents a first indicator of a political 
change derived from a cultural “shift”: from a consociational 
model, which, despite the conflicts among political subjects, 
accepts “ a minimum of fundamentals”, to a centrifugal 
scheme based on the sole will of the relative majority: 
“That Reform, adopted at the very end of the legislature, 
with a restricted majority, has produced a constitutional jerk 
in our republican tradition that has been used as a “model” 
for further jerks, like the one carried out by Berlusconi 
concerning the electoral law, in 2005. That precedent has a 
negative effect whose injuries we are still paying nowadays. 
Discontinuing with the precedent Constitutional reform 
approval practices is been a great damage!” 
Pol.Lazio2 
In this ‘strategic’ dimension relating to the conduct of the 
political actors of the reform, the contrast between regions 
and state –  after the new phase of “centralization” and the 
consequent ‘hold’ of funds started in 2012  - also assumes 
an instrumental connotation: some local political elites, for 
example, justify their opposition to financial cuts in the form 
of needs for services and pursuit of virtuous principles of 
good administration. 
This justification masks the need to maintain position and 
revenues through the ability to manage the consensus 
network, useful to their self-perpetuation. 
The hypothesis, deriving from the content analysis of a 
witness from the Umbria Region, is confirmed in other 
interviews, including that of a director from the Lazio 
Region, who admits that the costs of the Regional Council - 
leavened by about 700% (from 2 to less than 14 million euro) 
in two years - are in fact the ploy used by the Governor 
(Renata Polverini) to ‘reward’ the counsellors and maintain, 
in this way, the appearance of political cohesion: 
‘That kind of funding, given to the groups, was the way in 
which Polverini paid his majority, and without that tool, 
probably, the majority would have dissolved two years 
before: this is the point that is not discussed enough!’ 
Pol. Lazio1 
Upstream of the distorting effects produced by the reform 
of Title V, the absence of control mechanisms on regional 
spending and, above all, on responsibility (administrative 
and political) at the head of cost centres have then acted upon. 
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Not surprisingly, the control function has found a louder and 
louder supplementary role, over the past 10 years, in the 
Constitutional Court (called to settle disputes between State 
and Regions in terms of concurrent legislation, and 
litigations increased from 25 in 2000 to 141 in 2010) and the 
Court of Auditors, required in the increasingly complex task 
of local governments budgets verification [11]. 
The loss of political accountability and the subsidiary role 
played by both the Constitutional Court and the Court of 
Auditors, represent another trait of the changing political 
attitudes:  the increase in power and availability of 
resources in the hands of regional agents have joined the lack 
of control ‘from above’ and of local accountability tools. For 
this reason 20 micro-systems were born, where local 
political elites gained more autonomy (and thus power) 
compared to the national leadership, exercising and 
reinforcing it through a ‘tipping policy’: 
“Since you put an élite at the government of a region, it is 
obvious that this group will try to be reconfirmed. From the 
moment that the élite has this political problem it will spend 
all the instrument it possesses…Italian regions, through a 
wide political and financial autonomy ,have a lot of 
resources…think about public hiring…I think you 
understand what I mean!”  
Pol. Umbria 2 
Other examples of fragmentation and conflict that arose in 
defence of special interests involve the political parties. The 
analysis of interviews and documentary sources has 
highlighted a rift that is not ‘horizontal’ and exogenous, i.e. 
between the political organisation and the society, but rather 
has a ‘vertical’ character and is endogenous, i.e. relating to 
internal relations in political parties. 
Local politics have been, therefore, the cumulative effect 
of personalisation (due to electoral reforms and the changing 
balance in the relations between the County President, 
Council and the Councillors occurred with L. C. 1/99) and 
the increase in legislative, administrative and spending 
functions, without, we repeat, a proper provision for control 
tools and accountability. 
Regions have therefore become ‘autonomous territories’ 
even in the political-party system, for which:  
‘You have a weak political party that chooses, or rather, is to 
take the road - not even of notability, but with a more modern 
expression of a ‘franchising party’- where there is a 
unwritten agreement between a national level, which sees 
things on a high scale, and a schizophrenia of a local level, 
which cannot tolerate, let’s say, the annoyance and 
interference from what was once the organised political 
entity, that is the political party’. 
Pol.Lazio 1 
The presence of this ‘gap’ between centre and periphery, 
coupled with the autonomy of the latter, crosses and exceeds 
the sociological phenomenon described as ‘self-perpetuation’ 
of organisations. 
On one side, we are witnessing phenomena such as the 
dubious unconsciousness - or should we say the clear 
connivance - which came out in the Lazio Region from 
statements of non-involvement from leaders and members of 
opposing groups, who were sitting on the benches of the 
Regional Council when scandals exploded in reference to the 
use of public funds. This connivance encourages deletion of 
the last control tool left as safeguard of the virtuous use of 
local authorities expenditure: the local political opposition. 
On the other side, more than witnessing an element of 
self-perpetuation in organisational terms (i.e. party), these 
episodes will show an excess in favour of the conservative 
principles ‘ad personam’, which aimed to ensure the 
permanence of individuals, together with their ‘followers’ 
and their relationship networks and local interests. 
The case of federal reform in Italy shows a double face, 
and a the same “double ethic” mentioned by Montanari in her 
studies concerning Italian national identity [12 ]: on the one 
hand, we have the call to ‘overturn’ of all political 
components at any level of government (with the exception 
of the representatives from La Lega), that appealed to 
principles of social cohesion and solidarity - while not giving 
up the pursuit of a different ‘institutional framework’ - and 
wanted to pursue a principle of ‘rapprochement’ of politics 
and public administration to citizens and their needs. 
A face, therefore, deeply steeped in rhetorical sense of 
morality, democracy and a spirit of service towards the 
community. 
On the other hand, in the political and administrative 
‘backstage’ away from the stage of television politics or of 
‘net-politics’, we have records of Parliamentary Committees, 
documents submitted by various institutional stakeholders in 
the hearing process, reports of institutions such as the 
Constitutional Court or the Court of Auditors, which 
describe a profoundly different and much more complex 
reality, in whose plot - made more of mutual vetoes than 
shared tracks - lie at least two forms of conflict deriving from 
particular interests. 
The first conflict has a territorial nature, with a first 
expression at a vertical level: so we have Local Authorities 
against Central Government. Along this axis lie the local 
authorities ‘complaints’ aimed at the demiurgic role of the 
Ministry of Economy and Finance, in regard to the 
decision-making procedures related to public finances, 
transfers and cuts to local resources. Also in this area are 
located the accusations of uncontrolled spending addressed 
to the management of the central government of the state. 
The second expression has rather an horizontal axis: 
central and northern regions against southern regions. In this 
sense, we can read, for example, the responses of directors 
following the first SOSE results, related to the ‘adjustment’ 
and the consequential scenario deriving from the application 
of the essential Levels of performance. 
There is then a second type of conflict or friction also 
detectable at both local and central levels: we speak of the 
struggle between majority and opposition, between political 
parties, or coalitions of parties or ‘party coalitions’ that 
occupy leadership positions, and their counterparts lined up 
 Sociology and Anthropology 3(7): 351-360, 2015 355 
 
on the minority banks. 
Depending on the topic under discussion and the listening 
audience, the conflicting structures change, intertwine, 
overlap, to the point of pushing Cammelli [13] to talk about a 
‘gattopardesca’ situation (that shows to adhere to the new 
order not to lose power and ancient privileges) in reference to 
the evolution of approval process of fiscal federalism. 
At the centre of this ‘multi-dimensional friction’ there is a 
principle, or rather the pursuit of its circumvention, and a 
purpose: the principle is that of responsibility; the purpose, 
on the contrary, is the perpetuation of the obtained advantage 
position at individual or group level. 
Reading the sequence of events in the light of this 
interpretive key, the statements of 'need for institutional 
reform in the federal sense to be performed at parliamentary 
level' - made by local political representatives, in the face of 
the real stalemate that exists in the representative offices - 
appears understandable. 
It is clear, then, as many local politicians do not find the 
cause of explosion of malpractice phenomena in the 
implementation of service decentralization following the 
federal reform, even if regions have, as a consequence of the 
reform, become 'financially irresponsible' cost centres - as 
noted by the Court of Accounts, so much to make it rise by 
700% for costs related to Council functions, in cases such as 
the Lazio Region. 
Moreover, Antonini [13] writes: 'The year was 2005, when, 
at a meeting on the hypothesis to predict a federal Senate 
starting from the second legislature after the one that was 
taking place, a senior senator objected to me: 'but if, from 
2011, you reduce the Senate current powers, then what will I 
do?'. It's an emblematic episode of the resistance that is 
encountered when the reformers must reform themselves’. 
We have gone from a period of twenty years (the one 
enclosed roughly between 1990 and 2009) of local political 
'irresponsibility' in the mechanisms for the use of public 
resources spraying from the centre to the 'periphery', on the 
basis of historical cost criteria, to a phase of cost 
re-centralization, performed through the attempt to 'transfer' 
the responsibility for cuts to local level, made even more 
necessary by the fiscal and economic-financial crisis. 
To all this, an intrinsic characteristic of the employment 
and development system (both regional and national) must 
then also be connected - the peculiarity of which directly 
involves citizens, as co-responsible for the impasse of such a 
structural reform. 
In the presence of a political class that escapes the 
principle of responsibility, trying to 'transfer it' to a level of 
government other than the one occupied, by chasing votes 
and 'prebende' (benefits) [14], it binds in fact a part of society 
that accepts this dysfunction in exchange for economic and / 
or employment benefit [15], fostering in this way a vicious 
circle that undermines the effectiveness of any institutional 
reform aimed at a structural rationalization of expenditure, 
according to standard needs to be met, to guaranteed 
consistent performance and, especially, to 
equalization-oriented mechanisms inclined to social equity. 
In conclusion, values and behavioral patterns emerged in 
this brief description concerning the Italian federal reform 
path, show an overall cultural frame which has lost its public 
dimension, its national aim in favour of local and personal 
interests. 
 If the cultural substratum which animates a constitutional 
reform is characterized by the lack of the political class 
accountability - combined with a widespread inclination to 
'privately' manage public affairs - and a predisposition to the 
demand for excessive state aid from minute percentages of 
the population, it is almost a foregone conclusion that any 
attempt towards a federalist institutional reorganisation is 
intended to run aground, resulting in yet another case of 
general disadvantage arising from the fear of losing special 
benefits. 
Opinions and facts harvested in this part of the article 
refers only to a specific case, but, as one privileged witness 
has told: 
“The entire system lays on malfeasances and a wrong use of 
the public goods. Unfortunately this is an endemic feature of 
Italian democracy. A political and cultural phenomenon, 
which is turning into a distinctive trait of the entire country”. 
Administrative Director, Lazio 3 
Thus, what we’re facing is a wider systemic cultural 
“attitude”, describe by De Mucci [16] through a psychiatric 
metaphor, as a case of “dissociative democracy” that “seems 
to have built its foundation over a cultural issue that has 
been going for the last 20 years”. 
De Mucci talks about the tendency to develop a 
quarrelsome environment characterized by a mutual 
delegitimization not only between political parties, but also 
between institutional actors like the executive and the 
judicial powers, resulting in a scenario that closely resembles 
a paradoxical “civil cold war”. 
The next part of the article will explore this definition by 
giving some additional examples of political and social 
actions driven by a lack of civicness and public leanings. 
3. Particularism, Fragmentation and 
Illegality in the Italian Society 
By no chance Premier Renzi has based all his political 
communication efforts on symbolic and cultural components: 
from an attempt to establish a renewed civic spirit through a 
process of modernizing Italian administrative institutions 
and mechanisms and through the strong request to stay 
united, collaborate and engage in dialogue trained on the 
country's political, social and economic powers. 
The key words are “reform”, “streamline”, “speed up” as 
well as the now celebrated binomial: junk and pave over. 
Nor is it by chance that the only way to rise up out of the 
quicksand of the recession is to give the Italian system a 
shakeup with a balanced dose of pragmatism and optimism, 
leadership and a spirit of sharing, confidence and a dream. A 
right and proper dream of an Italian Renaissance as 
356 Having Lost for Fear of Losing: Culture, Individual Interests and the Negative Spiral of the Italian Case  
 
prescribed by the daily Le Monde. 
So the sole solution is an attempt at a laborious 
reorganization working above all at the psychological and 
values levels and thus culturally. 
But recourse to this set of symbols representing a political 
spirit can be justified only in light of the reality which must 
be profoundly changed, thus a sign of the opposite. 
Though what the premier represents and calls for are 
written on a semantic slate dominated by optimism, a 
reformist spirit, innovation and a competitive stance, the 
explosive reality of the last two years revolves around the 
umpteenth scandals linking politics and business interests 
and provincial attitudes, singularism and anti-competition: 
we are referring to the Expo 2015 scandal, the MOSE - the 
Venice tide barrier project – case, and the last “Mafia 
Capitale” example of  widespread corruption concerning 
local representatives, managers and civil society 
organizations in Rome. 
Luca Zaia, the governor of the region caught up in the 
MOSE scandal surrounding the construction of the Venice 
tide barriers, commented, “Of course, we are evaluating an 
investigation framework which, if confirmed, opens onto a 
gloomy national picture. The Finance Police, senior 
magistrates, the secret services... there's enough for 
everybody... a dark chapter for the region because 
everybody comes away penalized, the managers, politics, 
business”. 
These cases of national and international relevance are 
flanked by tens of thousands of examples at the local and 
micro-local levels. Taken all together, aside from the 
monetary scale of the benefits derived from illegal activities, 
these episodes paint a tragic picture of the collective national 
image, of identity and the political and enterprise culture. 
From the bankruptcy of the Azienda Ospedaliera San 
Raffaele Hospital in Milan, which literally squandered more 
than a billion euro with the involvement of public and private 
managers, wheeler-dealer intermediaries and regional 
managers, politicians and secretaries on to the more recent 
case of the abandoned mattresses in Rome where worn-out 
mattresses were left out soaking in the rain overnight on 
sidewalks and the proprietor of a company on the site raked 
in profits on the loss and even the costs of junking the goods 
[19].  
Other than illegal gains, similar episodes reported feature 
a total lack of civicness precisely because fiscal damages fall 
on the collectivity and to these must be added damage to the 
environment resulting from the degradation produced by 
similar instances of illegal conduct. 
Illegality, bribery and corruption can be ascribed as 
cultural indicators, more specifically as an index of the 
scarcity of democratic and state principles; their presence in 
such a massive quantity within a national community 
weakens the social ties, the sense of belonging to a common 
group and the own relationships between citizens and 
political institutions. 
Moreover, even if they do not directly affect the majority 
of the population, their diffusion through the media 
contributes to generate a “perception” whose effects will be 
real, according to the famous Thomas’ theorem. 
In a recent study of illegality in Italy with a special look 
into the mechanisms of production, reproduction and the 
transformation of trust in regulations, Costabile and Fantozzi 
[20 p.24] affirmed, “present conditions in the country are 
perceived as worrisome especially due to a number of 
determined factors which can be identified as due mainly to a 
rare civic sense, the inadequacy of politicians and a 
widespread culture of illegality”. 
In the framework of this research, Pirzio and Marchetti [21 
p.176] found that the sensation of illegality comes to the fore 
as the perception of the surrounding environment and a 
representation from above. Following on the above quoted 
Thomas's theorem, in this way certain effects result in spite 
of a premise built on sensations rather than empirical 
evidence: “The perception of living in a context in which 
certain practices are widespread or seen as such leads to the 
de-responsibilization of the individual, de-legitimizing 
conduct which respects legality”. 
In spite of the random potential of representations, data 
and estimates based on statistics arriving from the very real 
effects of individual conduct on a vast scale confirm the view: 
the extent of the now consolidated practice of the partial or 
non-payment of taxes, for example, while seeking private 
benefits to the detriment of public advantages is made clear 
by the annual Finance Police reports. 
Other than the general figures of a shadow economy of 
about 20% plus a further 10% for the illegal economy for a 
total of some 30%, the 2013 report disclosed, for example, 
that more than one-third of retailers do not issue receipts, that 
out of more than 400,000 checks carried out 32% of these 
showed failures to issue receipts [22]. 
The volume of fraud to the damage of the national and 
European Union budgets come to about 1.5 billion euro 
through practices which involve mainly false declarations of 
facilitated social benefits, public health surcharges, funds 
allocated for the support of enterprise and assistance and 
lines pension of financing [22 p19]. There is then a lengthy 
chapter on tendering public sector contracts with procedures 
which cost the public coffers more than 1.3 billion euro in 
2013 alone. 
From north to south, the ways and means for fixing 
tenders often show great creativity. In Brindisi, Finance 
Police investigators found an organization made up of 
businesses and local public health officials who split the take 
of work contracted out by eliminating the competition. In 
Monza the owners of a number of enterprises were able to 
win contracts valued at 260 million euro through bribes paid 
out to public officials whose duties included drawing up the 
technical specification for tenders. The requisites for bidders, 
thanks to the payoffs, were so stringent that the same 
enterprises always won the contracts [23]. 
The sphere of enterprise and these links to local 
administrations and national politics is not, however, the 
only area with a lack of a civic sense and activities aimed at 
benefiting the individual even in violation of the regulations. 
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Corriere della Sera, one of the most ancient and prestigious 
Italian newspapers, has reported on the scale of jobs held 
down not only by workers in black or not registered but also 
by public servants performing two jobs who, in some cases, 
aggravate the conflict of interest between public sector 
employees and private sector professionals. Out of 1,376 
checks run in this area, 1,704 workers holding down two jobs 
were discovered [23]. 
In the first two months of 2014, the Court of Auditors 
received reports on 104 individuals at work in the national 
public health sector who generated losses of 150 million euro 
for the system. The list included medical doctors, 
pharmaceutical sales representatives, patients, hospital 
managers and the like who passed off cosmetic plastic 
surgery for operations performed for serious pathologies, 
simulated emergency admissions to private clinics and 
prescriptions for enormous amounts of pharmaceutical 
products for subjects with no real need for them [24]. 
The picture which emerges is only a minimum glimpse of 
the phenomena of bad practices, fraud, illegal conduct 
perpetrated to the detriment of the general public and to the 
benefit of the individuals who strongly populate all the 
economic and occupational sectors of the country at all 
levels. 
This cultural trait, that is to act for a personal benefit using 
all the methods, including illegal ones, without any regards 
toward the community, turns individual actions into systemic 
causes of failure. Coping with this type of widespread 
conduct in operation for a lengthy period of time, it becomes 
clear that the system has suffered blows as regards 
competitiveness, innovations and the ability to develop or 
react to crisis conditions. 
The 2014 report on competitiveness drafted by the 
International Institute for Management Development ranks 
Italy 46th out of the sixty nations included in the dossier 
compared to 40th in 2012 [25]. 
Faced with these losses of resources, opportunities and 
wealth at the collective level, the distribution of income has 
become even more unequal. In 1981 10% of the population 
accounted for 26% of the nation's total wealth and by 2009 
this percentage had climbed to 34% of total wealth signaling 
the advantages gained by a limited minority [26 p.32]. On the 
other hand, the taxation of private individuals as well as 
businesses has climbed to thereby favor an unequal sharing 
out of the burden which fuels the state machinery, that is, 
public services, that is, welfare. Fiscal pressure calculated by 
ISTAT, the National Statistics Institute, had been increased 
in relation to GDP from 40% in 2000 to 43.8% in 2013. 
Fiscal pressure grows up because of the growing 
percentage of fiscal evasion, therefore even if it is a minority 
of the population to elude the fiscal dues, its majority will 
pay – in the long term - the most relevant consequences. 
From macro-economic and financial data we move on to 
other evidence which testifies to the spread of values, 
orientations and attitudes in pursuit of special, if not personal, 
interests. We are referring to the persistence of guilds, 
categories and castes in the professional fields ensuring 
advantages – which are rarely touched by political 
interventions – for those in these positions compared to the 
outsiders. 
In this connection, Sabino Cassese wrote in 1998 of the 
public hand in national economic development which has 
been decisive not only in state interference but also through 
“the most varied requests for public aid” and especially 
requests for “the recognition of positions of privilege”. The 
jurist refers to the “re-feudalization” of the state, to “private 
interests (which) are mixed in with public interests, 
organized into complex networks where it is difficult to 
distinguish between what is dictated by the state and what is 
instead requested by groups, categories, agencies” [28 p. 
67]. 
More than ten years after Cassese's essay, studies of the 
relationships between the state and the economy result in 
findings which are not dissimilar. The only change seen in 
research conducted by Costabile and Fantozzi is the term 
used to describe the phenomenon, no longer re-feudalization 
but “neo-patrimonialism”. 
The definition is however more or less identical: the 
private and impartial use of power or, in broader terms, 
“those phenomena recurring more and more frequently today 
in the fields of politics, the economy, the professions and 
administrative apparatuses which involve the personal use of 
the goods of public and private administrations for the aim of 
gaining a particular advantage for those in power or in some 
way linked to power” [20 p. 26] 
In 2002 Mauro Fotia took up the phenomena of lobbyism 
and the deeply fragmented structures of interests which 
connote Italy. The fiscal crisis of the state is not especially 
Italian but in this country it takes on an exceptional 
connotation and to understand it, according to the sociologist, 
one must look to the mechanism and workings of the 
political system which is defined by its porosity and 
transformation form of governance and the “shapeless and 
irresponsible” strengthening of democracy [28]. 
One of the leading causes of the crisis however can be 
assigned not so much to the political sphere but to the social 
side. According to Fotia the collective conscience, the 
awareness of being a part of the broader social structure and 
not merely a family nucleus but belonging to a group 
(whether friends or professional) has been subjected to a 
process of breakdown leading to a pluralistic phase 
(articulation of interests), a state of disorder and right and 
proper fragmentation. In this way, for example, rather than 
being controlled, public spending is subjected to the 
influence of a theory of increasingly broader interests which 
include not only the great industrial groups but must also 
take into consideration the great rentier class, construction 
enterprises, the aggregations of categories, organized 
representatives of commerce, professional groups and so on 
[28 p.10]. 
This fragmentation of the collective conscience in favor of 
the defense of special interests is witnessed daily: from 
strikes and the labor union agitation of municipal employees 
opposing the threat of a cut of their subsidiary salaries 
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(linked to production but actually paid out like “rainfall”), 
and on to standoffs in such categories as taxi drivers, service 
station operators, lawyers and pharmacists facing 
liberalization. 
And the attempt to defend financial and political positions 
attained, to preserve them from attacks from the competition, 
those who are excluded and pressing to get inside and take 
part and even colleagues attempting to grow joined to the 
need of political party formations for self-perpetuation set 
the stage for systematic disorder which, over the long run, 
falls back not only on those who enjoy lesser privileges 
(students, women, workers on short term contracts, the 
indigent) but the very groups holding on to their privileges. 
This part has given some empirical evidence of social 
actions and widespread behaviors guided by the will to gain 
or preserve a personal or clannish advantage. 
Thus, the Federal Reform case is only an example of a 
wider systemic loss of civicness and adherence to a 
normative vision of democracy that finds its evidence in both 
the political and social field: the only noticeable 
performances by Italian governments, as De Mucci [16] 
states, consist in the effort to demolish every policy reform 
passed by the previous majority, while politics, in general, 
seems to be more and more self-referential and dissociated 
from society. 
In the local dimension, the federal reform has conferred to 
regional and municipal governments more and more 
decision-making powers without any counter-balancing 
power of control and accountability until reaching a 
“neo-patrimonialistic” stage of de-development. This is one 
of the factors which led to briberies and to the growth of 
corruption scandals showed in this article. 
If the political system has shown a lack of accountability 
and responsiveness together with a decline of spirit of  
service towards its constituency, Italian society didn’t act 
better, even if, in this dimension, we can find a paradoxical 
situation. If it’s true that behind the corruption of a 
representative or of a civil servant there is always a private 
citizen as well as it’s true that many professional categories 
do not want to give away their privileges, so as to highlight 
several cases of fragmentation and illegality among  citizens, 
contrary to what previous studies affirm, these 
un-democratic, illegal or individualistic practices do not 
affect the sociological concepts of “social capital” and all the 
consequences that a decline of social networks can produce 
in terms of the political culture that “makes a democracy 
work”. 
It’s not a question of “bowling alone”, as Putnam [29] 
states, because Italian citizens still participate both in politics 
and in the civil society’s traditional fields. Furthermore, 
associations play a more and more important role as agencies 
of mutual aid, like the scientific works of Donati explain [30], 
and this means that a form of solidarity exists. Moreover, this 
role is not only qualitative, as membership within charities or 
in other forms of civic engagement are in constant growth 
like Montanari [31 ] and Cesareo [32] point out in their 
studies. 
So, concerning the societal dimension, it seems not to be 
the lack of social ties that produce the negative effects the 
article has described. On the contrary, it’s by looking at the 
quality and range of these ties that the cultural factor comes 
to light in all its importance. While the largest associations, 
like parties and trade unions, are losing members, a plethora 
of local or small organizations rise every day, with the strong 
help of the web 2.0 tools. 
Thus, if the social ties still exist, and if the affinity to a 
community is still considered a seminal value for individuals, 
is the “national” dimension, the sense of belonging to a 
national community, that is in question. 
It’s, more in general, a matter of widespread social trust, 
like some evidences show, or, using a similar concept, is a 
matter of collective identity, both at a national and at a 
supranational level. 
Italian society appears resigned to pessimism about the 
future of Europe as well as the nation (see the data released in 
the 2013 Eurobarometer report), a society which believes the 
worst of the crisis is yet to come and, especially, one 
displaying scant awareness of one's own rights (66% of the 
sample confirmed their ignorance of the rights associated 
with the concept of European citizenship). 
As we have seen, this is a sharply divided society, 
fragmented, equipped with an extremely limited civic sense. 
Reports issued by the Observatory of Civil Culture in Italy 
provide snapshots of a social climate in which “there remain 
private areas occupying the preeminent positions and the 
bottom of the top ten must be reached to find a dimension (of 
solidarity) which takes the connections of the collective into 
account. Moreover, it must be underscored that all the 
options linked to a commitment (political obviously and also 
religious, social and environmental) are at the tail end of all 
the classifications from 2001 to the present” [33 p.12]. 
Above all, is the diffidence in interactions one with 
another, the Other: 80% of the people interviewed think “one 
can never been too careful in dealing with people”, and 75% 
of the sample believe that if the occasion comes up, others 
will take advantage of one's good faith. The trust scale shows 
a steady decline. 
So taken all together, this distrust, fragmentation of social 
ties (not inexistence), defense of privilege, dissemination of 
illegal phenomena, particularism and parochial mentality 
help to define and better pin down our opening hypotheses. 
The reasons of these traits are to be found in the 
construction, diffusion and reproduction of Italian collective 
identity. 
4. The Italian Identity 
General examples and the specific case study paint a 
picture the contents which can be summarized in the title of 
this article. The title could be better broken down as follows: 
an entire collective has given ground as regards opportunities, 
material wealth, confidence in those above them, in 
enfranchising rights, guarantees, social and labor protection 
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and safeguards for the fear that some of its members will lose 
something of these values, or someone. 
As indicated, our key to interpretation lies in a cultural 
matrix: there are specific behavioral traits, determined values 
which orient the attitudes of a national collective which, 
when added to the effects of the general individualization 
process, lead to the breakup of the collective conscience, 
seeking refuge in particularism and the resulting crisis in the 
national system in its entirety. The cases examined display 
for us a reality dominated by special interests, the 
neo-patrimonial management of public resources, the 
relentless advance of illegal phenomena, barriers erected by 
entire categories in the defense of privileges and advantages, 
the alienation of the elderly and new socio-economic 
categories such as women, youth, foreigners, short-term 
contract workers, and the pulverization of social ties. 
Read on the basis of constructivism categories [6], these 
phenomena can be apprehended as the effect of a cultural 
and symbolic order which, through the crystallization of 
habits, has come about to determine the repetition of 
schemes which “lead the way we perceive the conduct of 
others”.  
These representations play a dual role: one, precisely, 
captures the salient traits of the Italy; the other disseminates 
these traits, reiterates and transmits them to the point of 
transforming them into the “self-evident” reality in the 
common sense. Thus these traits – all the while shaping 
values, customs, behavior – originate with the orientation of 
the conduct of the collective to which they apply. 
This is the reasons the led Cammelli to talk about a 
“gattopardesca” situation concerning the Federal Reform 
process: as everybody knows, one of the main sentences of 
“The Gattopardo” (The Leopard) - the famous Italian novel 
written in 1958 by Tomasi di Lampedusa - is “If we want 
things to stay as they are, things will have to change”. 
Even if referred to the Italian “Risorgimento” historical 
period, that is the second half of XIX century, this sentence 
gives a synthetic cultural overview whose effectiveness still 
goes on: in effect, nowadays De Mucci talks about 
self-referential political élites engaged in demolishing every 
policy reform passed by the previous majorities. 
The Leopard, is a novel which gives us a representation of 
an historic period, but it contains also symbols, and the 
animal figure of the title itself is been transformed into a 
symbol which synthetizes the permanence of privileges 
thanks to an appearance of a deep and widespread change. 
The dichotomy of the reality at present consists of 
privileges and alienation, an increasing narrow and powerful 
élite and the every growing masses invariably hidden away 
from their economic possibilities. 
But this dichotomy conceals others which return us to 
behavioral stereotypes: the arrogant and the fool; the 
braggart and the victim; the clever and the tormented; the 
cynic and the idealist. 
These modes of behaviour play a large part in Italian 
artistic and literary works, that is, in the mechanism of 
production, diffusion and reproduction of symbols which 
contribute to shape and to preserve a specific collective 
identity. How would it not be possible, for example, to 
recognize Don Rodrigo in the classic “I Promessi Sposi” 
(The Betrothed), the stereotype of the arrogant aristocratic 
liar plying the strength of his privileged status, ready for 
recourse to violence though he is afraid of his henchman 
Griso who would work to materially perform this violence? 
There is a multitude of other examples coming from our 
national literary and artistic production. Returning to author 
Alessandro Manzoni's characters, there is Don Abbondio, 
the incarnation of a coward caught up in a conflict of ethics 
between his role as a priest and fear of the consequences of 
conduct which would be ethical. Then there are the 
characters created in Giovanni Verga's short stories, victims 
dominated by reverence for the forces of nature, seeking 
refuge in the role of divine providence and attachment to 
“stuff” as the material dimension of life. 
This lineup of Italian stereotype representatives could be 
extended to the motion picture industry. “Il Sorpasso” (The 
Easy Life) is a 1962 film directed by Dino Risi featuring 
Vittorio Gassman as a braggart, an anti-conformist who 
belittles rules and social conventions to display, thirty years 
ahead of his time, generational friction which would 
ultimately come to the fore. Later, in the 1970s, Fantozzi, 
played by Paolo Villaggio, came to the screen as the 
incarnation of the harassed but loyal victim surrounded by 
his cynical colleagues who take advantage of him, laugh at 
and exploit him while he remains humble before the 
authority of his superiors. 
To reach the cynic, disillusion caused by overly idealistic 
youth, there is the recent Italian cinema masterwork 
featuring the character Jep Gambardella, the protagonist of 
“La Grande Bellezza” (The Great Beauty). 
This 2013 film provides a glimpse of the Italy of the 21st 
century, a decadent society shot in a city, Rome, in which the 
sole traits of sublime splendor emanate from the past, the 
imperial and republican ruins, the residences of the capital's 
aristocracy. A society described through the cynical and 
ruthless glance of a man on the verge of old age. A world in 
which a sense of resignation, ennui, stopped up by the effect 
of the diversions in flights into evasion and amusements, 
parties, dinners and artistic performances, predominate. 
Representations of the present social stratification can be 
perceived even in the spacial arrangements of the scenes. A 
penthouse serves as the setting for an anomic routine in 
which members of a restricted élite gather, journalists, 
entrepreneurs, politicians and priests representing the 
privileged. Lower down, spatially and metaphorically, is the 
ant hill of the people, the motor vehicle traffic of those who 
wearily lead their lives. Standing out above, in the latest 
construction of materials and symbols, is the residence of a 
character as mysterious as he is discreet, a representative of 
the sphere of finance, the corrupted or the corrupter. The 
character is arrested and is proud of what he does and of 
himself at the same time, so much so that he categorizes 
himself neither as “the Italy which works, which produces.” 
From an historic point of view, these characteristics find 
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confirmation in the political and institutional scale of 
fragmentation of the Italian peninsula. This fragmentation 
began with the fall of the Roman Empire and was continued 
with the rise of city state realities which, on the one hand, 
contributed to the birth and strengthening of the spirit of 
mercantilism and proto-capitalism and, on the other, 
impeded the development of a sense of belonging linked to a 
collective dimension on a national scale as opposed to what 
occurred in England and France. This parochialism is 
strengthened thanks to the special relationship between 
Italians and authority as perceived in relations of patronage 
and exploitation of these relations. In many cases, these 
relations are seen as linked more to a status of a subject rather 
than that of a citizen. 
The own “double morality”, shown by representatives and 
described in the federal reform case study, finds its historical 
explanation in the contemporary presence of a “double 
authority” which had to be respected [3]: on one hand, the 
Prince; on the other hand, the spiritual power represented by 
the Pope. Later, after the national building process, this 
double authority has turn into State and religious order. 
The collective stalemate as regards civic, political and 
economic matters has today reached its highest level and can 
be shared in a summary of the words of Revelli [34] for 
describing numerous cases of social malaise in Italy: “They 
talk all together, but each for oneself, of perverse solitude 
which is never declared in the uproar in the aisle of a 
supermarket; of a defeat exchanged, too often due to 
occasion and opportunity (…), they are radical losers, 
deluded by having won (…) they are the 
anthropological-cultural translation of the Italy which has 
fallen, deluding itself that thinking it has grown”. 
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